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Abstract 
This paper investigates how community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) has 
determined membership to rights over forestry and wildlife resources in Botswana, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe. The legal frameworks in these countries emphasise geographic location, which can be 
referred to as a ‘community of place’, with the residents determining membership. While 
recognising the limitations highlighted by CBNRM critics, it must be acknowledged that authority 
and boundary (‘area of jurisdiction’) are equally important. Any poorly defined link between 
authority and boundary would invite criticism, and would be seen as an essential flaw in any 
common property regime. Membership of wildlife and forest management regimes in Botswana, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe is based on geographic location and residence, the latter being based on 
social elements such as kinship and marriage, cultural affiliation and social networks. 
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1 Introduction 
The people-centred approach in southern Africa can be regarded as an initiative aimed at creating 
collective community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) without the ‘tragedies’ 
referred to in common property literature. The approaches adopted in different southern African 
countries differ in focus as a result of the legal frameworks governing the collective management of 
natural resources in the countries in question (Rihoy 1995). The respective emphases range from 
disbursement of economic benefits and the development of local-level resource management 
mechanisms, to ecological concerns and social and cultural issues. Lessons and experiences 
recorded in common property literature call for the clear demarcation of boundaries and definitions 
of those individuals and households with the right to access collectively managed natural resources 
(Murphree & Hulme 1999; Ostrom 1990). The CBNRM legal frameworks in the various countries 
are essentially responses to this call. 
This paper focuses on responses to definitions of individuals and households, also referred to as 
members, with rights. It attempts to disentangle the respective roles of the legal frameworks and the 
various customary and non-customary factors at play in Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe, in the 
determination of membership of individuals from access to and benefits from collectively managed 
forest and wildlife resources. The information used in this paper is based on a review of legal 
documents, including policies and legislation relating to natural resources in Botswana, Namibia 
and Zimbabwe. 
A key concern of this paper is that of ‘natural resource tenure’, the policy and legal instruments in 
place, which determine social and institutional relationships regarding access to and management of 
natural resources. Murombedzi (1990) argues that if they are to be meaningful, rights to natural 
resources should be exclusive and enforceable. Firstly, the holder of such rights over resources 
should be in a position to exclude others from accessing and benefiting from the resources in 
question. Secondly, the holder should have the ability to enforce such exclusion in the long term 
(Murphree 1996). Thirdly, according to Murphree, the rights should be based on as few conditions 
as possible. In other words, the extent of limitations attached to rights is in inverse proportion to 
their strength. This means that the fewer the limitations, the stronger they are likely to be, and vice 
versa. The authority vested in individuals is what makes it possible for the holders of rights to 
decide how to manage the natural resources, and whom to exclude. The right of exclusion is 
primarily enacted through the operational rules of access, which are collectively decided and 
determine the criteria which individuals must satisfy in order to have access to forest and wildlife 
resources.  
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2 Background to property rights systems in southern Africa 
Property rights systems in southern Africa stem directly from the social engineering policies of the 
colonial past. This has been the case in two of the countries under discussion, namely Namibia and 
Zimbabwe. Botswana, by virtue of having been a British protectorate rather than a colony, has 
experienced a different historical evolution, and was not subject to massive settlement by white 
settler farmers of European descent. As a result, white farmers in Botswana have acquired only 
5.5% of the land in freehold ownership (Rihoy et al. 1999). Botswana has also succeeded in 
preserving customary tenure systems, with about 71% of the land today being classified as tribal 
land, which is regulated by the Tribal Land Act of 1968 (Rihoy et al. 1999).  
In Namibia and Zimbabwe, on the other hand, remnants of the colonial administrative formations 
continue to influence the patterns of proprietary rights over land and natural resource management. 
These policies and practices gave preference to freehold and state proprietary systems, to the 
detriment of centuries-old indigenous and customary systems. Fundamental differences that 
consequently emerged between communal and freehold property rights regimes have been 
adequately researched and documented. For example, Murphree (1996) sums up these differences 
by referring to a crucial correlation that exists between the strength of property rights and the type 
of land tenure, asserting that the strength of rights of ownership over land is determined by the time-
frame of ownership and the scope of the conditions to which such ownership is subject. Therefore, 
‘the longer their sanctioned duration, the stronger the rights will be’ (Murphree 1996:6). If this 
measure is applied to the three types of property rights commonly found in southern Africa, namely 
state, private and commons, it becomes quite clear that state and freehold property rights systems 
have been dominant for over a hundred years.  
The right to own private property, for example, has been well codified through laws, and has even 
been entrenched in the constitutions of countries such as Namibia and South Africa. At the same 
time, states have appropriated to themselves ownership of all other resources not owned under 
freehold tenure. This state ownership, which has been declared in a blanket fashion and mostly 
without any clear policy guidelines or directives, includes communal use areas and the resources 
found there. These communal use areas, identified by group or collective rights of access to natural 
resources, were neglected for the best part of the 20th century because of this policy inertia.  
Against this background, Ostrom (1990) argues that customary resource management regimes 
throughout sub-Saharan Africa lost their built-in regulatory mechanisms and authority because they 
were undermined by colonial and post-independence policies. It would also be fair to argue that 
current people-centred approaches in southern Africa are indeed seeking to reverse the erosion of 
customary systems and rights regimes initiated by colonial governments and subsequently 
perpetuated by post-colonial governments. Without exception – and this includes Botswana – all 
people-centred approaches have had to deal with the issue of what should be deemed the 
appropriate management institution for natural resources in communal use areas. While contextual 
differences are fully appreciated, distinct strands of thought pertaining to new conservation 
strategies can be isolated.  
Murphree and Hulme (1999) argue that there is a marked departure from the state-coerced 
separation of proximate natural resource users from the natural resources, and that the new 
approach effectively seeks to make communal area dwellers a locus of conservation ‘imaginings’. 
They argue that these imaginings manifest themselves in a number of ways. On the one hand, there 
are the fairly radical approaches that devolve a full package of management responsibility and 
property rights to the lowest level of community organisations (as in Namibia for example). In these 
cases, community-level management institutions are established and empowered to receive and hold 
proprietary rights and to manage common resources. On the other hand communities are merely 
perceived as neighbours, as for example in the ‘parks and neighbours’ approaches identified by 
Rihoy (1995).  
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3 Membership and common property resources 
The Mariam-Webster Online Dictionary (www.m-w.com) defines membership as ‘a group of 
people associated by some common tie or occupation and regarded as an entity, the whole’. A 
member, then, is an individual belonging to a larger group. Three elements can be distinguished: an 
individual, a clearly distinguishable larger group (the whole) and a common tie. The issue of a 
common tie is crucial, as it is the basis of exclusion, and serves as an attraction for outsiders who 
desire to belong to the group. Additionally, it drives the definition of the ground rules of the group, 
and serves as the basis for the dispensing of sanctions and rewards, and for the determination of 
benefits to which eligible members are entitled. This definition of membership is consistent with the 
group dynamics that characterise common property natural resources management. 
Several design principles have been proposed to make common property regimes, as distinct from 
‘open access’ scenarios, successful. The recognition of the rights, roles and responsibilities of 
individuals and emphasis on their membership of the resource user community are essential for 
distinguishing between the user community and outsiders. Design principles for successful natural 
resources management include clear definitions of the limits placed on the use of forest and/or 
wildlife resources, and clearly defined individuals or households with the right to harvest such 
resources (Constanza & Folke 1996). 
Murphree (1993) identifies five principles for successful common property resource management 
(CPRM), two of which are relevant to this paper. The first is that ‘the unit of proprietorship must be 
the unit of production, management and benefit’. This emphasises ownership as being central to the 
success of CBNRM regimes. The principle is basically that a group of common property resource 
managers should be able to identify themselves as the owners of the resources they manage, and 
that this ownership must be recognised by neighbouring communities and all other decision-making 
institutions. Turner (1996) asserts that this principle implies that members of the management unit 
should have unambiguous powers to exclude non-members. The second is that ‘the unit of 
proprietorship should be as small as practically possible, within ecological and socio-political 
constraints’. The need for as small a size of unit as is practical could be interpreted as emphasising 
close relationships between the members of units of proprietorship. The members should ideally 
know each other and meet often to discuss issues related to resources management, be able to exert 
peer pressure on one another, and recognise themselves as part of an established local institution.  
A review of the literature suggests that legal recognition of communal resource use rights, including 
the right to use forest and wildlife resources, is key to the successful prevention of exclusion under 
communal property regimes. Where communities do not have the right to exclude others from using 
wildlife and forest resources, there is the distinct possibility that such resources will become ‘open 
access’ resources, where individuals may increase their personal benefits from the resources at the 
expense of the broader community (Bromley & Cernea 1989; Jones 1995). 
It is evident from the foregoing that the idealised goal of effective common property regimes is to 
replace the government-centred management and allocation of wildlife and forest resources, with 
local community structures consisting of managing groups with fixed memberships, that allocate 
access to well-defined and delimited resources through specified procedures (Turner 1999). This is 
illustrated by the case studies from Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe that follow.  
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4 Evidence from case studies 
Membership issues are discussed from the perspective of experiences from Botswana, Zimbabwe 
and Namibia.  
In Botswana, the government passed the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act in 1992, 
with the explicit goal of enabling communities living on what are called ‘non-gazetted lands’ to 
play a greater role in managing their natural resources and to benefit directly from them. This 
legislative reform marked the official adoption of what has become known as the Botswana Natural 
Resources Management Programme (BNRMP) (USAID 1994). In terms of the BNRMP 
arrangements, the entire country (excluding protected areas and other proclaimed lands) has been 
divided into controlled hunting areas (CHAs) and wildlife management areas (WMAs), which have 
been zoned for various types of wildlife use (USAID 1993). Communities living in these areas are 
eligible to apply for tourism leases and wildlife quotas from the Department of Wildlife Services 
(DoWS). Such communities are required to conform to a few requirements in order to qualify for 
the leases.  
The Botswana community-based natural resources management policy (DoWS 2004) seeks to 
clarify the natural resources rights that may be delegated to communities, including rights of 
management, use and access, and the steps required for communities to be accorded such rights. 
Although the policy has several objectives, this paper focuses on the objectives that pertain to issues 
of rights, access and exclusion.  
The policy explicitly states that all citizens have an equal interest in open access property, and that 
no identifiable individual or group enjoys primary access or management privileges to the exclusion 
of others. Regarding access to resources in community property regimes, however, the policy states 
that primary interest may be held by an identifiable community in its entirety, and that such a 
community enjoys primary access rights and is entitled to associated benefits. The difference 
between the two property regimes in the policy lies in the entitlements citizens can enjoy. 
Representative and accountable legal entities (RALEs), for example community trusts, can be 
classified as community property regimes. Examples of RALEs are the Chobe Enclave, the 
Shankuyu Community Trust, the Xai Xai Community Trust and the Boro/ Standidibe Community 
Trust (Rihoy et al. 1999). Members of the trusts qualify to enjoy access rights and benefits derived 
from the management of forest and wildlife resources within the trusts’ defined geographic 
locations. If a trust has been accorded exclusive use rights, non-members can, in theory at least, be 
excluded from enjoying such rights. Such exclusion might be difficult to effect, however, and 
establishing whether or not it occurs in practice would require further investigation. Communities 
are legally entitled to sublease their rights to private operators, and to retain the revenue that 
accrues. The statutory bodies managing these arrangements are the Land Boards, which manage 
tourism leases, and the DoWS, which administers wildlife quotas. 
We turn now to the situation in Zimbabwe. Here, a review of wildlife management policies and 
legislation undertaken by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWM) 
resulted in an amendment to the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1982 (Thomas 1995a). This amendment 
made provision for the DNPWM to confer ‘appropriate authority status’ (Thomas, 1995b:12) on 
rural district councils (RDCs) with communal lands within their boundaries, and gave rise to the 
Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (Campfire).1 This conferment 
of appropriate authority status constituted a legal devolvement by central government of the right to 
manage and derive benefits from wildlife resources in Zimbabwe’s communal areas (Hasler 1995).  
The RDCs are essentially structures of local government with a statutory mandate to co-ordinate 
development in the areas under their control. They were considered to be the appropriate bodies in 
which to vest the authority to manage communal lands, on the grounds that their members are 
democratically elected inhabitants of the districts, who would therefore be best placed to represent 
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the interests of inhabitants at the district level. Under the Campfire programme, 36 of the 52 RDCs 
in Zimbabwe have been accorded appropriate authority status (Rihoy et al. 1999). 
Campfire made use of existing decentralised local government institutions as units of management. 
Although the RDCs receive and hold authority, benefits that accrue from wildlife are distributed 
according to wards. Critical questions have been raised about the suitability of local government 
institutions as units for wildlife management, as the areas under their control have been demarcated 
primarily on the basis of demographic considerations, rather than wildlife management 
considerations (Murombedzi 1991).  
In Namibia, the Nature Conservation Amendment Act 5 of 1996 replaced the Nature Conservation 
Ordinance of 1975, which was discriminatory in that it gave commercial farmers the right to utilise 
wildlife on their properties, but withheld the same right from residents of communal lands. The 
legislation made provision for the formation of local wildlife management institutions called 
‘conservancies’, to receive and hold wildlife management rights on behalf of the constituent 
communities. According to the Ministry of the Environment and Tourism (MET) (1995:6), a 
conservancy is ‘a community or group of communities within a defined geographic area who jointly 
manage, conserve and utilise wildlife resources’. A conservancy is to be managed as a unit, and the 
members must share in the benefits from their combined management in an equitable manner. The 
law requires that, to be legally registered with the MET, a conservancy must have a membership 
register, a constitution, an elected management committee and defined geographic boundaries. The 
legal framework for conservancies stresses the social definition of a membership group that takes 
on the responsibility for managing a natural resource (Turner 1996). The boundaries of the 
community of resource users, and of the resources under management of the community, are 
socially defined. Conservancies are thus legally constituted, membership-based wildlife 
management institutions. 
In summary, it is evident that the legal frameworks in Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe place 
emphasis on geographic location, which can be referred to as the ‘community of place’, and on 
residency as factors that determine membership. It is clear, therefore, that the ‘community of place’ 
must have boundaries of jurisdiction and authority (trusts, conservancies and RDCs) to manage the 
resources on behalf of the community. In all three cases, unlike the ‘fenced boundaries’ of parks 
surrounding several communities, the boundaries are social (political, traditional and community-
based) and flexible, insofar as they are established through negotiation and consensus, which is 
most notably the case in Namibia. This means that boundaries alone cannot be used to exclude 
those who are not members of the wildlife management institution. Communities residing outside 
the boundaries, who use resources other than wildlife resources within the boundaries, will continue 
to do so, and any change in this pattern of usage would have to be negotiated between the 
‘community of place’ and the ‘community of use’, who in most cases are non-members. The rights 
held by the ‘community of use’ are entrenched in customary and traditional modes of livelihood, 
and these know no boundaries. 
What emerges from the foregoing discussion is the porosity, fragility and flexibility of boundaries 
in geographically defined regimes (‘community of place’), a characteristic which CBNRM critics 
continue to emphasise. The porosity of boundaries is further demonstrated by Dore (2001), who 
cites several studies investigating the rules governing the use of non-wildlife natural resources in 
Zimbabwe’s communal areas. For example, Lynam et al. (1996) revealed how the households from 
two villages in the Zambezi valley were not able to meet their needs from resources within their 
respective village boundaries. The study found that a large number of households had unrestricted 
access to and use of resources outside village and even ward boundaries.  
Similarly, Mandondo (2001) found that administrative boundaries have little effect on villagers’ use 
of natural resources. If anything, practical considerations such as ‘availability, ease of access, ease 
of transportation and … proximity’ (Mandondo 2001:10), play a stronger role than the issue of 
5 
Commons Southern Africa occasional paper; no. 14 
ownership. As a result, it can be argued that there is a profound need for further meticulous 
investigation, analysis and documentation of factors influencing the rules governing management, 
access and use rights with respect to non-wildlife resources in Zimbabwe’s communal areas. The 
investigation could further be extended to Namibia and Botswana, where there are similar 
occurrences of the ‘community of use’ utilising resources beyond the socially constituted wildlife 
management boundaries. 
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5 Institutionalising membership  
In Zimbabwe, Campfire chose RDCs for resource management as a matter of convenience, and it 
may be argued that the Zimbabwean programme appears to have found ready-made answers to 
questions relating to membership and exclusion. Residence in a village, obviously proven through 
accepted social parameters such as kinship and lineage, constitutes the key factor in determining an 
individual’s entitlement to Campfire benefits. This entitlement permeates upwards to ward and 
district levels, as the case may be. Zimbabwean communities are therefore legally defined through 
political administrative boundaries, and the interests of individual resource users combine in wards. 
By virtue of their residing in a geographic area, communities are defined as resource users, and are 
therefore automatic holders of use and access rights over wildlife and forest resources within the 
administrative boundaries of their places of residence.  
For the purposes of CBNRM, communities in Botswana consist of a diverse set of people with 
varied socio-economic interests and capabilities, sharing an interest in conservation and living 
within a legally defined geographic area (DoWS 2004). The policy places emphasis on the social 
and economic relations that exist between various individuals, households and villages, by virtue of 
which they are deemed to constitute a community. Lineage is a strong element of social relations 
and associations, and can exist between households and villages, and even beyond defined 
communities. However, the legally defined geographic area might minimise the relevance of 
lineage membership across different geographic, and resource use and management areas.  
In Namibia, a conservancy is defined as ‘a community or group of communities within a defined 
geographic area’. Individuals must apply for membership of a conservancy, and their membership 
must be registered. Although residence within the boundaries of a conservancy is a key factor 
determining eligibility for membership, the registration requirement makes conservancy 
membership voluntary and optional. Technically, certain residents of an area declared as a 
conservancy or seeking such declaration could decide not to join the conservancy. Non-registered 
residents of the conservancy area are not regarded as members of the local institution 
(conservancy). Although they may be community members by virtue of their residence within the 
social boundaries, and may also be resource users, they can theoretically be excluded from 
benefiting from and making decisions pertaining to wildlife and tourism by virtue of their not being 
members of the conservancy. 
Clause 10 in the model conservancy constitution shows that conservancies in Namibia, like their 
counterparts in Botswana, realise the importance of being inclusive. However, inclusion in Namibia 
is subject to the condition that the individual applies for membership and is accepted by the 
management committee as a member. This condition places a limitation on the stated inclusive 
approach, as it is exclusive in nature. Customary use and management rights, decision-making 
powers, and ultimately the capacity to derive benefits from wildlife and forest resources can be lost 
if the individual fails to register himself or herself. 
Membership of wildlife and forest management regimes in Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe is 
clearly based on geographic location and residence, which in turn are determined by social elements 
such as kinship and marriage, cultural affiliations and social networks. Further definition of 
membership in Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe is required at the community level. By-laws and 
criteria such as age and residence are used to determine membership, especially in Namibia and 
Botswana. For example, the conservancy constitution of the Sorris Sorris Conservancy in Namibia 
states that: 
members shall be all adults over the age of 18 years [and] all heads of households who 
permanently reside within the boundaries of the conservancy, or who were born within the 
boundaries of the conservancy, but reside outside the boundaries for the purpose of full-time 
employment. 
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However, people meeting the above requirements can only become members on acceptance of their 
applications for membership by the management committee, on the basis of their being blood 
relatives of or married to existing members. This definition of what constitutes membership is 
almost identical in all conservancies across Namibia, with the few deviations being in matters such 
as sub-clauses that require members to indicate in writing that they accept membership of the 
conservancy, together with the rights and obligations of members as determined by the 
conservancy’s constitution (Mosimane 2003a). These examples illustrate that membership in 
Namibia is – or can be – exclusive, since everyone is required to apply for membership and to be 
registered, and non-registration results in exclusion. 
Community members at risk of being excluded in Namibia are mainly those who are illiterate, 
marginalised and poor. They tend to lack information about and understanding of conservancies, 
and to be apathetic regarding conservancy activities. If these community members are not 
encouraged and given support aimed at assisting them to exercise their right to participate and to 
take decisions regarding the management of wildlife and forest resources, they may never do so. 
There are also some who might have registered as a result of the initiatives of the local wildlife and 
forest management institution, but who do not have access to information. Their participation is 
limited, and they are likely to remain on the periphery of conservancy activities. Regular meetings, 
annual general meetings and representative structures and initiatives aimed at ensuring the 
participation of members have not yet yielded the desired results. The challenge, therefore, is to 
increase participation in decision-making and to include all community members in wildlife and 
forest management activities. 
The Namibian case study, which can be regarded as an example of an exclusive regime, raises 
several other issues that conservancies need to address. For example, non-members would still 
enjoy the same entitlement to communal grazing, water and forest resources as conservancy 
members. Should the conservancy members then exclude such non-members from the benefits 
generated through the conservancy’s activities? In at least one case that the authors have observed, 
the conservancy has chosen not to exclude non-members residing in the conservancy, from such 
benefits. The ≠Khoadi ||Hoas Conservancy in the Kunene Region experiences immense farmer-
elephant conflicts, especially in relation to water. Elephants consume water that the farmers pump 
with diesel, which has been bought at their own expense. To assist the affected farmers, the 
conservancy uses its hunting income to purchase diesel in bulk, and sells it to the farmers at a 
highly subsidised price. It has been observed that the conservancy does not distinguish between 
members and non-members when selling this diesel. 
The issue of membership is, therefore, proving to be a challenge that must be addressed by 
management and decision-making structures within conservancies. An interesting question that 
arises relating to the debate on application for membership, is whether conservancies are required to 
revisit and update their membership registers, or whether having a register in the formative stages is 
a once-off requirement for registration as a conservancy. 
Mosimane (1998; 2003a) cites communities who argue that their consent to the formation of a 
conservancy should be enough to guarantee them membership of the conservancy. They 
furthermore argue that the fact that they are resident in the conservancy, which normally follows 
traditional boundaries of affiliation, and that they are not disobeying the rules and regulations or by-
laws of the conservancy should guarantee them membership. Another example that shows the 
limitations of membership through application and registration can be found in the inability of the 
Uukwaluudhi Conservancy to register all conservancy members. On the basis of the high population 
density in the area, an exemption was made in this case, and only the respective village headmen 
were registered, who then ‘represented’ the members of their villages (Hassam 2004). This 
exemption was, however, contrary to the established legal framework for establishing conservancies 
in Namibia, which illustrates the immense challenges communities face in connection with the 
registration of members. 
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Conservancies are also legally required to develop wildlife management plans to the satisfaction of 
the MET. Such management plans are essentially land-use zoning plans, for example, for multiple-
use, exclusive wildlife and trophy hunting, tourism concessions and common grazing zones. In 
practice, conservancies are only able to enforce adherence to these plans by residents (members and 
non-members alike) through consensus and peer pressure. The right to exclude outsiders from either 
settling within the conservancy area or using its non-wildlife natural resources, and the ability to 
control inimical activities on the part of non-member residents remains outside the powers of a 
conservancy, and this significantly diminishes its viability. It is possible that in-migrants and non-
members who are not supportive of the goals and management plans of the conservancy could 
effectively undermine the conservancy with impunity.  
In contrast to Namibia, Botswana has the same age and residence requirements in most community 
trusts, but recognises the importance of inclusion. Membership is therefore automatically extended 
to all community members of participating villages, or it is voluntary and based on interest (Cassidy 
2001). The community defines itself, and decides to be inclusive, without any policy or legal 
requirement to register individuals as members. Membership is therefore a consequence of 
residence, kinship and marriage, and is affected by cultural, social, economic and other factors 
within the community. Exclusion in Botswana is flexible, and is practised in the context of the 
existing customary rights of community members. The all-inclusive approach adopted by the 
community trusts reduces conflict and marginalisation of some community members in terms of 
access to resources, the right to be involved in management decisions, and the deriving of benefits. 
The acknowledgement of the customary rights held under the prevailing cultural common property 
regime prevents the violation of the prevailing customary regime, thus reducing conflict between 
the regimes. 
The issues raised above highlight the challenges associated with registered or formalised 
membership in common property regimes. While they are only evident in the Namibian case thus 
far, they may present other countries with the opportunity to assess their own membership 
requirements and related community by-laws. This may enable them to provide solutions for the 
challenges faced in Namibia, and for conservancy members (and non-members) in all three 
countries to learn from one another.  
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6 Conclusion 
The question of membership in CBNRM in southern Africa and people-centred approaches in 
general present a challenge to the definition of legal and institutional frameworks across natural 
resource sectors. Definition of boundaries, natural resources, institutions and communities, which 
are all determined through customary and other social factors, establish whom to exclude from 
natural resource benefits. The paper shows that in Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe emphasis is 
placed on geographic locations, which in turn illustrates the need to have boundaries of jurisdiction 
and authority to manage the ‘community’ resources. In Namibia and Zimbabwe it is clearly evident 
that excluding community members living outside boundaries from using resources is not possible 
under the CBNRM or people-centred approach. This is mainly because boundaries alone cannot be 
used to exclude non-members for the reason that they are established through negotiation and 
consensus, and therefore are also flexible.  
Although non-members in all three case studies can theoretically be excluded, technically it could 
never be enforced. The paper recognises that customary rights of exclusion and exclusion on the 
basis of formalised membership will continue to co-exist at community level. Therefore, exclusion 
should be kept flexible and be practiced within the context of existing customary rights of 
community members. People-centred approaches should aim for inclusion of all community 
members and exclusion should only be considered as a disincentive for non-compliance with the 
group rights. 
10 
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Endnote 
                                                 
1 According to the Zimbabwean decentralisation system, a district is the largest unit, and comprises several wards; a 
ward is a sub-district unit usually made up of six villages or 6 000 people, while a village, as the smallest unit, 
represents 100 households (Murombedzi 1991) 
